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Abstract
Recently, attention has been given to formally characterize security policies that are enforceable by different kinds of
security mechanisms. A very important research problem is the characterization of security policies that are enforceable by
execution monitors constrained by memory limitations. This paper contributes to give more precise answers to this research
problem. To represent execution monitors constrained by memory limitations, we introduce a new class of automata,
bounded history automata. Characterizing memory limitations leads us to deﬁne a precise taxonomy of security policies that
are enforceable under memory-limitation constraints.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Securing software platforms is based on specifying a set of security policies and deploying the appropriate
mechanisms to enforce them. The efforts of some pioneer authors [25,12,19,9] contribute to the emergence of a
new research ﬁeld that targets characterizing enforcementmechanisms and identifying the classes of enforceable
security policies. Since execution monitoring (EM) is a ubiquitous technique for security policies enforcement,
this class of enforcement mechanisms has attracted the attention of the majority of researchers in this ﬁeld.
Execution monitors are enforcement mechanisms operating alongside the execution of untrusted programs,
they intercept security relevant events, and intervene when an execution is attempting to violate the policy being
enforced. While halting the execution represents the common intervention action to respond to a violation,
execution monitors can have the power of inserting actions on behalf of the program or suppressing potentially
dangerous actions [2].
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Avery important researchproblem is the characterizationof securitypolicies that are enforceableby execution
monitors constrained by memory limitations. Providing precise answers to this research problem would guide
the elaboration and the evaluation of lightweight security mechanisms for memory-constrained systems (e.g.,
embedded platforms). Fong [9] is the ﬁrst one who presented an interesting attempt to answer this research
problem. He presented a general theoretical framework to characterize security policies that are enforceable by
execution monitors constrained by the available information about the execution history. However, the results
of Fong are limited to preﬁx-closed security policies over ﬁnite executions and do not provide precise answers
about the memory cost of security enforcement.
In this paper, we present a precise characterization of security policies that are enforceable by monitors
constrained by memory limitations. These constraints are represented by limiting the space used by monitors to
save the execution history. Our approach allows the characterization of security policies over ﬁnite or inﬁnite
executions. The targeted policies are those that are speciﬁed by security automata (SA) [25] and those that are
speciﬁed by edit automata (EA) [1]. We introduce bounded history automata (BHA) as subclasses of SA and EA
to characterize execution monitors using bounded memory to track the execution history.
An important contribution of this work is the investigation of locally testable properties enforcement. Locally
testable properties [3] are classes of languages where recognizing whether a sequence  belongs to a property
P is based on checking -subsequences of bounded size. We provide complete results deﬁning the connection
between locally testable properties and BHA-enforceable properties. Also, we deﬁne a general approach to
identify security policies that can be enforced by monitors tracking bounded execution histories.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We start by the related work in Section 2. In Section 3,
we present the main deﬁnitions that are used in the paper. Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation of the main
characterizations of execution monitoring enforcement. Section 5 is devoted to the presentation of bounded
history automata. In Section 6, we investigate EM-enforcement of locally testable properties. We end by the
conclusion and the future work in Section 7.
2. Related work
Schneider [25] is the pioneer in characterizing EM-enforceable security policies. His contribution is mainly
twofold: (1) characterizing EM-enforceable policies by security automata, and (2) identifying EM-enforceable
policies as a subset of safety properties. Jay Ligatti, Lujo Bauer, and David Walker [1, 18,19] have introduced edit
automata; a more detailed framework for reasoning about execution monitoring mechanisms. While Schneider
views execution monitors as sequence recognizers, Ligatti et al. view them as sequence transformers. Having
the power of modifying program actions at run time, edit automata are provably more powerful than security
automata [19]. Hamlen et al. [12] provided an arithmetic hierarchy-based taxonomy of enforceable security
policies. They investigated a larger set of enforcement mechanisms, including static enforcement, execution
monitoring and program rewriting. This taxonomy leads to amore accurate characterization of EM-enforceable
security policies.
Fong [9] provided a ﬁne-grained, information-based characterization of EM-enforceable policies. In order
to represent constraints on information available to execution monitors, he used abstraction functions over
sequences of monitored programs. He deﬁned a lattice on the space of all congruence relations over action
sequences aimed at comparing classes of EM-enforceable security policies. The latter are limited to safety
properties over ﬁnite executions. The investigated abstractions are (1) the mapping of action sequences onto
action sets and (2) the mapping of action sequences onto the Java execution stack contents.
3. Deﬁnitions
We start by some notations of language theory. An alphabet is a ﬁnite or inﬁnite set of symbols representing
program actions. In the sequel, we use interchangeably symbols and actions. The set of all ﬁnite sequences over
 is denoted by ∗. The set of all inﬁnite sequences over  is denoted by ω, and ∞ = ∗ ∪ω denotes the
set of all (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequences over . The empty sequence is denoted by . A sequence counting the
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actions a1, a2, . . . , an in this order is denoted by a1a2 . . . an. We use “a” to differentiate between the action a
and the sequence counting only the action a. We denote by ′ the concatenation of two sequences  and ′.
A language L over  is a subset of ∞. We denote by LL′ the concatenation of two languages L and L′. The
difference of two languages L and L′ is denoted by L \ L′. We denote by || the length of a sequence . The set
k = { ∈ ∗ : || = k} denotes the set of all possible sequences of length k where k is a positive integer. For
some positive integer k , k = { ∈ ∗ : ||  k} denotes the set of all possible sequences of length less than
or equal to k . The set (k ×k)k = {(, ′) ∈ k ×k : |′|  k} denotes the set of all possible pairs of
sequences such that the length of the concatenation of the two sequences is less than or equal to k where k is a
positive integer.
A sequence ′ is a preﬁx of a sequence  if there exists a sequence ′′ such that  = ′′′. Similarly, ′ is
a sufﬁx of  if there exists a sequence ′′ such that  = ′′′. We denote by [..k] the k length preﬁx of .
Similarly, [k + 1..] denotes the sufﬁx consisting of all but the ﬁrst k symbols of . We denote by Pref () the
set of all preﬁxes of a sequence . Similarly, Suf () denotes the set of all sufﬁxes of a sequence . A k length
factor of  starting at position i is denoted by [i..i + k − 1]. The set of all k length factors of  is denoted by
Factk() = {′ ∈ k |∃ ′′ ∈ ∗.∃′′′ ∈ ∞ :  = ′′′′′′}. The sets Pref k and Pref k are deﬁned, respectively,
by {′ ∈ Pref () : |′|  k} and {′ ∈ Pref () : |′| = k}. Similarly, Suf k() = {′ ∈ Suf () : |′|  k)} and
Suf k() = {′ ∈ Suf () : |′| = k)}.
We need also some deﬁnitions concerning security policies. A security policy P deﬁnes executions that are not
acceptable according to some security standpoint. A security policy P is a property if there exists a predicate Pˆ
over individual executions satisfying ∀ ∈ ∞.  ∈ P ⇔ Pˆ () where  is the set of possible actions. Therefore,
a security property P can be deﬁned as a set of sequences such that P ⊆ ∞. Accordingly, a sequence  satisﬁes
a security property P if and only if  ∈ P . A security property P is preﬁx-closed if and only if: ∀ ∈ ∞.  ∈
P ⇒ Pref() ⊆ P .
4. EM-enforcement characterization
Execution monitors (EM) are enforcement mechanisms that control the execution of untrusted programs.
They launch an intervention procedure when a controlled program is about to violate the policy being enforced.
We denote by conventional execution monitors (CEM) those monitors for which the intervention procedure
consists simply inhalting the execution.Wedenoteby rewriter-based executionmonitors (RWEM) thosemonitors
for which the intervention procedure is more powerful and may consist in inserting actions on behalf of the
program or suppress potentially dangerous actions. A policy that can be enforced by an execution monitor is
called EM-enforceable.
In this section, we recall the main characterizations of EM-enforcement. We present the two main characteri-
zations of EM-enforcement: security automata (SA) characterizing CEM and edit automata (EA) characterizing
RWEM. We present also the Fong’s information-based characterization of CEM-enforceable policies.
4.1. Security automata
According to Schneider [25], any CEM-enforceable security policy is preﬁx-closed. Access control [17],
boundedavailability [11],ChineseWall [6], andOne-Out-Of-k authorization [8] are examplesofCEM-enforceable
policies. Any CEM-enforceable policy can be speciﬁed by a security automaton.
In this characterization, a monitor can intervene only by halting the program execution. According to this
deﬁnition of EM-enforcement, Schneider [25] observes that every EM-enforceable security policy P is a preﬁx-
closed property. An EM-enforceable policy is speciﬁed by a security automaton.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Security automaton). A Security automaton (SA) [25] is a quadruple 〈,Q, q0, 〉 where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
•  : (Q ×) → Q is the (possibly partial) transition function.
C. Talhi et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 158–184 161
A sequence of input actions is accepted (recognized) by a security automaton if, starting from state q0 and
reading the sequence one input action at a time, a transition is deﬁned for each input action in the sequence and
the reached state. The automaton state changes according to each taken transition. This acceptance deﬁnition
is broad enough to cover ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences recognition and is represented by a recognition path. A
recognition path is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence of transition steps of the form q
a→ q′ where q′ = (q, a). We
denote by ∗() the last state reached by the path recognizing a ﬁnite sequence . Let AP denote the security
policy speciﬁed by a SA A. Thus, AP is the set of all, ﬁnite or inﬁnite, sequences recognized by A. If we consider
only ﬁnite sequences, we denote by APf ⊆ AP the set of all ﬁnite sequences of AP .
4.2. Edit automata
In addition to halting the execution of the controlled program,RWEMcanmodify the programactions either
by suppressing or inserting actions. A rewriter-based execution monitor can be speciﬁed by an edit automaton.
Deﬁnition 4.2 (Edit automaton). An edit automaton (EA) is deﬁned by a quadruple 〈,Q, q0, 〉 where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
•  : (Q ×) → (Q ×∞) is the (possibly partial) transition function.1
When given a current state q and an input action a, the transition function  speciﬁes a new state q′ to enter
and a sequence  to edit. The edited sequence  speciﬁes the intervention action to take by the execution monitor
in order to enforce the property: (1) If  = “a′′ then the input action a is to be accepted, (2) if  /=  ∧  /= “a′′
then the sequence  is to be inserted, and (3) if  =  then the input action a is to be suppressed. If the transition
function is not deﬁned for some state q and some action a, then the only possible intervention action that the
monitor can take in order to enforce the property is halting the execution. The automaton accepts a sequence
 if it can follow a valid path while reading the input actions of . A valid path is a (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) sequence
of transition steps of the form q0
[1]→[1] q1
[2]→[2] . . . qn−1
[n]→[n] qn . . . where ∀1 < i < ||.(qi−1, [i]) = 〈qi , i〉. Therefore,
the sequence edited by the edit automaton Awhile reading the input sequence  is 12 . . . n . . . and it is denoted
by A(). Let AP denote the property enforced by A. Since, EA can modify input sequences, they must obey to
the two main principles:
1. Soundness: For any input sequence , the sequence A() edited by an edit automaton A must satisfy the
property P enforced by A, i.e., A() ∈ P .
2. Transparency: The semantics of any execution satisfying the property must be preserved with respect to
some equivalence relation.
Edit automata ensure Soundness by transforming bad executions into valid executions, and ensure trans-
parency by transforming valid executions into equivalent valid executions. Any edit automaton satisfying
soundness and transparency is said to be an effective enforcer [1]. Let us denote by effective ∼= enforcement
the effective enforcement of edit automata based on a given equivalence relation ∼=.
Deﬁnition 4.3 (Effective ∼= Enforcement [1]). Let A be an edit automaton and ∼= an equivalence relation over
∞. The EA A effectively ∼= enforces P if and only if, for each sequence  ∈ ∞ we have: (1) A() ∈ P , and (2)
 ∈ P ⇒ A()∼=.
1 The transition function deﬁnition presented here is equivalent to the original deﬁnition of Ligatti et al. [1]. The only difference is that an
input action in our deﬁnition is consumed at each transition step while it is not consumed in an insert step of their deﬁnition. However, for
any edit automaton based on the deﬁnition in [1], it is easy to construct an equivalent automaton according to our deﬁnition. We adopt the
deﬁnition presented here mainly (1) to be closer to automata theory and (2) to facilitate automata construction in the proofs presentation.
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It has been proved [1, 19] that execution monitors that are speciﬁed by edit automata and acting as effective=
enforcers2 have more enforcement power than execution monitors that are speciﬁed by security automata.
Indeed, an execution monitor acting as effective= enforcer can suppress a sequence of potentially dangerous
actions until it can conﬁrm that the sequence is legal, at which point it inserts all the suppressed actions [1,
18,19]. Renewal properties is identiﬁed as a lower bound of properties that are effectively= enforceable by edit
automata.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Renewal property). A property P over ∞ is a renewal property if and only if it satisﬁes one of
the two following conditions:
∀ ∈ ω.  ∈ P ⇔ Pref () ∩ P is an infinite set (1)
∀ ∈ ω. ∈ P ⇔ ∀′ ∈ Pref (). ∃′′ ∈ Pref ().′ ∈ Pref (′′) ∧ ′′ ∈ P (2)
Proposition 4.5. [19] A property P over∞ is effectively= enforceable by edit automata if P is a renewal property
and  ∈ P.
Proof. Proposition 4.5 corresponds to Theorem 8 in [19]. The reason behind presenting a detailed proof of this
proposition is twofold: (1) adapting the proof provided in [19] to Deﬁnition 4.2 and (2) explaining the ideas
behind automata construction since they will be reused in many other proofs that are presented in this paper.
The edit automaton A, effectively= enforcing P , is deﬁned by 〈,Q, 〈, 〉, 〉 where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q = ∗ ×∗ is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states. Each state is a pair 〈Acc, Sup 〉 where
AccSup represents a ﬁnite sequence  for which Acc is the longest valid  preﬁx, i.e., the sequence edited by
the automaton while reading , and Sup is the sufﬁx of  that is suppressed by the automaton after reading
. Note that Sup =  for any valid sequence .
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state. It is the pair 〈, 〉, whichmeans that no preﬁx is accepted and no sufﬁx is suppressed.
•  : (Q ×) → (Q ×∞) is the transition function. For a state q = 〈Acc, Sup 〉 and an input action a, the
state q′ = (〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) is deﬁned by:
q′ =
⎧⎨
⎩
(〈Acc, Supa〉, ) if ((AccSupa /∈ P) ∧ (∃′ ∈ ∗ : AccSupa′ ∈ P))
(〈AccSupa, 〉, Supa) if (AccSupa ∈ P)
Undeﬁned, otherwise.
The transition function ensures that only valid preﬁxes (satisfying P ) will be edited by the automaton. We
have the two following cases:
a. For a ﬁnite input sequence  ∈ ∗, if  ∈ P then A() = , i.e., the entire sequence  will be edited by A. If
 /∈ P then the automaton A edits the longest valid preﬁx of .
b. For an inﬁnite sequence  ∈ ∞:
− If  ∈ P then the automaton edits all the valid preﬁxes of . Since a valid sequence can count
many invalid preﬁxes, for any invalid preﬁx 12 such that 1 is the longest valid preﬁx of 12,
the automaton edits 1 and suppresses the sequence 2 in order to reinsert it when reaching the
immediately next valid preﬁx 123.
− If  /∈ P then, by (2), there exists a longest valid preﬁx ′ of  for which any extension is an invalid
sequence. The automaton ensures the edition of all the valid sequences, i.e., all valid elements of
Pref (′). After editing the longest valid preﬁx ′ and reaching some state q′ , the automaton dos not
accept any extension since the transition function is not deﬁned for any input action from the state
q′ . 
2 In the rest of this paper, any mention of enforcement refers to effective= enforcement.
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4.3. Fong’s characterization
Fong [9] has proposed an information-based approach characterizing EM-enforceable security policies. The
proposed characterization is based on the information about the execution history that is available to execution
monitors. To represent the information available to an execution monitor, a set of abstract states is used. An
abstraction function  is deﬁned so that each abstract state represents a set of different ﬁnite executions. By
mapping different sequences onto a single abstract state, the set of sequences that are visible to an execution
monitor is reduced, and consequently, the set of security policies enforceable by that execution monitor is
reduced. An abstraction function is deﬁned according to the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.6 (Abstraction function[9]).
Let S be a ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite set of abstract states and let  be any function such that  : ∗ → S .
The function  is an abstraction function if it satisﬁes the following compatibility property:
∀w,w′ ∈ ∗.∀a ∈ .(w) = (w′) ⇒ (wa) = (w′a). (3)
The security automaton specifying the behavior of an executionmonitor tracking the abstract states is deﬁned
by an -security automaton (-SA).
Deﬁnition 4.7 (-SA[9]). Let  : ∗ → S be a compatible abstraction function. An -SA is a SA 〈, S ,(), 〉
such that for all w ∈ ∗ and for all a ∈ , either ((w), a) = (wa) or ((w), a) is not deﬁned at all.
The-SA-enforceable security policies are those that can be enforced bymonitors consuming the information
left behind by the abstraction function [9]. Shallow history automata (SHA) is a special class of -SA character-
izingmonitors tracking shallow access history. The information provided by a shallow access history determines
the set of actions that have been previously executed. The formal deﬁnition of shallow history automata is the
following.
Deﬁnition 4.8 (Shallow history automaton[9]). A shallow history automaton is a security automaton of the form
〈, 2,∅, 〉 where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input symbols.
• 2 is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states. Each state represents a shallow history.
• ∅ is the initial (shallow history) state.
•  : 2 × → 2 is the transition function.  is deﬁned such that:
∀ H ∈ 2.∀a ∈ . (H , a) =
{
H ∪ {a} if H is a valid shallow history (a)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (b)
5. Bounded history automata
Bounded history automata (BHA) is a class of automata characterizing security policies that are enforceable by
monitorsmanipulatingbounded space to track executionhistories.Within this class,we identify twomain classes:
bounded security automata (BSA) and bounded edit automata (BEA). To characterize a monitor tracking
bounded histories of length k , the BHA states set and the transition function are deﬁned such that:
• Each state represents a bounded history encoding an action sequence of bounded length.
• For a bounded history h and an input action a, the image h′ (if it is deﬁned), given by the transition function,
is an abstraction of the sequence ha.
5.1. Bounded security automata
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Bounded security automaton). A BSA of bound k (k-BSA) is a SA 〈,Q = k , q0, 〉 where:
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•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states. Each state in Q represents a bounded history of
a, possibly inﬁnite, set of accepted sequences.
• k deﬁnes the maximum size of a history.
• q0 is the initial state (usually the empty history ).
•  : (Q ×) → Q is the (possibly partial) transition function.
Intuitively, when a BSA A, is in the state h and reads an input action a, if there exists a state h′ such that
h′ = (h, a) then h′ is an abstraction of the history ha. This means that only the abstraction h′ of ha is relevant
for the enforcement of the security policy AP in any extension of ha. Thus, the transition function  deﬁnes an
abstraction function 	 : k+1 → k where (h, a) = 	(ha). We denote the abstraction function deﬁned by the
transition function of a BHA A by A	 . Since we are dealing with a class of security automata, the set of security
properties enforceable by BSA is a subset of the safety properties set. Let EMkSA denote the set of properties
enforceable by bounded security automata of bound k .
Theorem 5.2. For any two positive integers k and k ′ such that k < k ′, we have EMkSA ⊂ EMk ′SA.
Proof. First, we prove that any property of EMkSA can be enforced by a k ′-BSA. Second, we prove that there
exists a property in EMk ′SA that cannot be enforced by any k-BSA:
(1) Let P be a property of EMkSA. Then, there exists a k-BSA A enforcing P such that A = 〈,Q = k , q0, 〉.
The k ′-BSA enforcing P is A′ = 〈,Q′ = k ′ , q0, ′〉 where ′ : (k ′ ×) → k ′ is deﬁned such that
∀q ∈ k ′ .∀a ∈ .′(q, a) = (q, a) if  is deﬁned for q and a and is not deﬁned otherwise.
(2) There exists a property P ∈ EMk ′SA for which, there is no k-BSA enforcing it. This property is deﬁned by
P = {Pref (a1 . . . ak ′+1)}where the set of input actions is deﬁned by = {a1, . . . , ak ′+1}. Indeed, to recognize
the sequence a1 . . . ak ′+1 we need to save the history of the last k ′ actions which is not possible by any k-BSA
since k < k ′. 
5.2. Enforcing bounded availability properties using BSA
Bounded availability properties specify that any acquired resource must be released by some ﬁxed point later
in the execution. According to [25], a bounded availability property is EM-enforceable if it is speciﬁed such that
any resource cannot be acquired more than some MWT (maximum waiting time) execution steps without being
released. Enforcing such properties protects systems from denial of service attacks [11]. One can easily prove
that any k bounded availability property can be enforced by some k-BSA. Fig. 1 presents an example of a BSA
used to enforce Two-BA security property, which is a bounded availability property. Two-BA ensures that each
acquired resource must be released in at most two steps. The set of resources is {A,B}. Actions a and b represent
acquiring resource A and B, respectively, and actions a and b represent releasing resource A and B, respectively.
Action  represents any action that is neither an action acquiring a resource nor an action releasing a resource.
To enforce the property, each execution must satisfy the following rules:
(1) At each execution point, no resource is acquired more than two computational steps.
(2) If for one execution point, a resource is taken during one computation step then the only action permitted
by the automaton is the action releasing that resource. This is the case of states ba, b, a, ab, ba, and ab. For
the other states, the automaton can take any  action, any action acquiring a resource that is not already
acquired, or any action releasing a resource that is already acquired. This is the case of states , a, and b.
The size of historyneeded to enforce this property is twowhich is thebounddeﬁnedby theboundedavailability
property. The abstraction function 	 used to deﬁne the transition function is the following:
(a) = a (a) = a (aa¯) =  (ab) = ab (aa¯) = 
(b) = b (b) = b (bb¯) =  (ba) = ba (bb¯) = 
(aba¯) = ba¯ (ba¯b¯) =  (bab¯) = ab¯ (ab¯a¯) = 
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Fig. 1. A bounded security automaton enforcing the Two-BA property.
The three following results explain the connection between BSA and Fong’s -SA and SHA (the deﬁnitions
of abstraction functions, -SA, and SHA have been presented in 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, respectively).
Proposition 5.3. For any k-BSA A = 〈,Q = k , q0, 〉, there exists an -SA enforcing APf .
Proof. The -SA enforcing APf is deﬁned by the security automaton A
′ = 〈,Q′ = Q ∪ {bad},(), ′〉 where:
• The abstract states set Q′ contains all the states of Q with the addition of a new state bad representing any
bad sequence (not belonging to APf ).• The transition function ′ : (Q′ ×) → Q′ is deﬁned such that for any state q and any input action a, ′(q, a) =
(q, a) if  is deﬁned for the pair (q, a). Otherwise, ′ is not deﬁned.
• The abstraction function  : ∗ → Q is deﬁned by the following:
∀ ∈ ∗.() =
{
∗() if  ∈ APf
bad if  /∈ APf
The abstraction function  satisﬁes the compatibility property (3), i.e., for any action a ∈  and any two ﬁnite
sequences , ′ ∈ ∗, if () = (′) = h then (a) = (′a). We have the two following cases:
− If h = bad then , ′ /∈ APf and consequently any extension of  or ′ is not in APf . Therefore, a, ′a /∈
APf and (a) = (′a) = bad .
− If h /= bad then  and ′ are in APf . If there exists some state h′ ∈ Q for which (h, a) = h′ then
a and ′a are in APf and are reachable by two paths ending in the state h′ and by consequence
(a) = (′a) = h′. If there is no state h′ ∈ Q for which (h, a) = h′ then a and ′a are not in APf and
by consequence (a) = (′a) = bad . 
Proposition 5.4. Let A = 〈,Q,(), }〉 be an -SA enforcing a property P. The property P is BSA-enforceable if:
∃k ′ ∈ N+.|Q|  |k ′ | (4)
Proof. We prove this result by constructing the k-BSA enforcing the property P . If 4 is satisﬁed then we have:
∃	′ : Q → k ′ .∀q, q′ ∈ Q.q /= q′ ⇒ 	′(q) /= 	′(q′) (5)
Let k be the smallest positive integer satisfying 4, and let 	 be any mapping function satisfying 5. Note that
if the set of abstract states Q is ﬁnite, then the existence of k and 	 is guaranteed and k  |Q|.
The k-BSA enforcing P is deﬁned by the SA A′ = 〈,Q′ = k ,	(()), ′〉 where the transition function
′ : (Q′ ×) → Q′ is deﬁned such that for any abstract state q ∈ Q and any input action a, ′(	(q), a) = (q, a)
if  is deﬁned for the pair q, a). Otherwise, ′ is not deﬁned.
It is obvious that the -SA A and the k-BSA A′ enforce the same property since A and A′ deﬁne the same
automaton under state renaming. 
Corollary 5.5. If the set of input actions  is ﬁnite such that || = k , then, for any SHA enforcing a property P ,
there exists a k-BSA enforcing P.
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Proof. This result can be directly derived from Proposition 5.4. Let A = 〈, 2,∅, 〉 be the shallow history
automaton enforcing the property P . If  is ﬁnite then the set 2, which is the set of all states of A, is ﬁnite
also and Condition 4 is satisﬁed. Indeed, the smallest positive integer satisfying Condition 4 is k = || and the
mapping function can be Act : k → 2 which is the function that returns, for each sequence , the set of
actions that are present in . Therefore, by Proposition 5.4, there exists a BSA enforcing P . The k-BSA enforcing
P is deﬁned by 〈,k , , ′〉 where the transition function ′ is deﬁned by: ∀ ∈ k .∀a ∈ .
′(, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
 if a ∈ Act () (a)
a if a /∈ Act () ∧ (Act (), a) = Act () ∪ {a} (b)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (c)
Notice that the length of the sequence resulting from rule (b) is always less than or equal to k , since we allow
at most one occurrence of an action in . 
Corollary 5.6. Let A = 〈, 2,∅, 〉 be a SHA enforcing a property P. The property P is BSA-enforceable if:
∃k ′ ∈ N+.∀q ∈ Q′.|q|  k ′. (6)
where Q′ ⊂ Q is the set of states that are actually used to deﬁne the sequences of P.
Proof. We prove this result by constructing the k-BSA enforcing the property P . Let k be the smallest positive
integer satisfying 6. The k-BSA enforcing P is deﬁned by the SA A′ = 〈,k , , ′〉where the transition function
′ is deﬁned by: ∀ ∈ k .∀a ∈  :
′(, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
 if a ∈ Act () (a)
a if a /∈ Act () ∧ (Act (), a) = Act () ∪ {a} (b)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (c)

5.2.1. K-BSA vs -SA
Even if, by Proposition 5.3, any k-BSA can be viewed as an -SA, k-BSA are more precise than -SA for
specifying properties to be enforced undermemory-limitation constraints. Indeed, while -SA provides the exact
information needed to enforce a policy by an execution monitor, k-BSA provides an estimation of the memory
size used by the execution monitor to track that information.
If Condition 4 (Proposition 5.4) is not satisﬁed, then the amount of information left behind by the abstraction
function  is too broad to be tracked by a bounded history. This implies that enforcing the policy speciﬁed by
such -SA may require tracking the full execution history. Viewed in this light, Condition 4 can be used as a
selection criteria on security policies to enforce on memory-limited systems. Indeed, a security policy cannot
be enforced under memory-limitation constraints if there is no abstraction function considerably reducing the
amount of information needed to enforce that policy.
Finally, by Corollary 5.5, for ﬁnite input actions sets, BSA have more enforcement power than SHA. Indeed,
any BSA-enforceale property distinguishing between two sequences counting the same set of actions, is not
enforceable by any SHA. However, requiring in Corollary 5.5, that the input actions set must be a ﬁnite set is too
restrictive. Although the state set of a SHA is inﬁnite when the input actions set is inﬁnite, the number of states,
actually used to deﬁne the sequences of a SHA-enforceable policy is not necessary inﬁnite. Therefore Corollary
5.6 speciﬁes ,when the input actions set is inﬁnite, condition to satisfy by a SHA-enforceable property in order
to be BSA-enforceable.
5.3. Enforcing SHA-enforceable properties using BSA
Corollary 5.5 allows the identiﬁcation of any SHA-enforceable property (when the actions set  is ﬁnite) as
BHA-enforceable. In the sequel, we show how some SHA-enforceable properties can be enforced using BSA.3
3 These properties were provided by Fong in [9].
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5.3.1. Chinese Wall policy
The Chinese Wall policy [6] is an access control policy that deﬁnes the necessary rules to prevent con-
ﬂict of interest. Conﬂict of interest can be characterized by accessing both the information of a party and
the information of its competitor. To enforce this policy an execution monitor must check for each access
whether the targeted information belongs to a party that is in conﬂict of interest with some party for which
some crucial information has been already disclosed to the accessing subject. To characterize this policy, the
set of all subjects is deﬁned by S , the set of all protected objects is deﬁned by O, the set of all conﬂict of
interest classes is deﬁned by T , and each object o ∈ O belongs to some conﬂict of interest class t ∈ T . Since
the order of access events is not needed to enforce the policy, Chinese Wall policy is SHA-enforceable [9]
and by Corollary 5.5, it is enforceable by some k-BSA if the subject set S and the object set O are ﬁnite and
|S × O| = k .
5.3.2. Low-Water-Mark policy (for Subjects)
Low-Water-Mark policy is deﬁned by Biba in [4]. This policy deﬁnes the rules to be enforced within a system
of entities where each entity can be either a subject or an object and to each entity e is assigned an integrity level
l(e). The set of objects is denoted by O and the set of subjects is denoted by S . The possible actions of the system
are read (s, o),write (s, o), and exec (s, o)where s, s′ are any two subjects, o, o′ are any two objects. The set of all
possible actions is deﬁned by  = {read(s, o)|s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O} ∪ {exec(s, s′)|s, s′ ∈ S} ∪{write(s, o)|s ∈ S ∧ o ∈ O}.
The three actions read(), write() and exec() obey to the following rules:
• read(s, o) is allowed without any constraint and modiﬁes the integrity level of as follows: l(s) ← l(s) ∧ l(o)
where ∧ is the greatest lower bound over integrity levels.
• write(s, o) is allowed if and only if l(s)  l(o).
• exec(s, s′) is allowed if and only if l(s)  l(s′).
Objects integrity levels are assigned once and thus are unchangeable while subjects integrity levels can be
modiﬁed by read actions. Since allowing any action depends only on the set of the already executed actions,
this policy is SHA-enforceable [9] and by consequence it is enforceable by some k-BSA if the set  is ﬁnite and
k = ||.
5.3.3. One-Out-Of-k Authorization policy
The One-Out-Of-k Authorization policy [8] speciﬁes the access authorization rules by classifying programs
into equivalence classes. Each equivalence class speciﬁes a set of access authorizations that are granted to each
program of that class. Whether one program belongs to a particular equivalence class depends on the actions
performed by the program during execution. Once, a program is classiﬁed into some equivalence class, it can
perform any action that is authorized for the class. An example of equivalence classes is provided in [8] where
programs are classiﬁed into three classes: Browser, Editor and Shell. For example, if a program has opened a
network socket, it is classiﬁed as a browser, and will be prevented from reading user ﬁles. This policy is SHA-
enforceable [9] and consequently is enforceable by some k-BSA if the set of all possible actions  is ﬁnite such
that k = ||.
5.3.4. Assured pipelines policy
Assured pipelines [31,5] is a policy that ensures the integrity of data that are processed by pipelines of trans-
formation procedures. This policy is deﬁned for a set of data objects O and a set of transformation procedures
S where create is a special member of S . The set of possible actions is S × O which characterizes the application
of transformation procedures to data objects. An assured pipelines policy is deﬁned by an enabling relation
e ⊆ S × S satisfying the two following constraints [9]:
• No circularity: the binary relation deﬁnes a directed acyclic graph (DAG).
• No pair of the form 〈s, create〉 may be included: create is the sole source node of the acyclic graph.
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Intuitively, if a pair 〈s, s′〉 is in the relation e then any action 〈s′, o〉 is allowed if and only if the last action
performed on the object o is 〈s, o〉. According to [9], assured pipelines policy is enforceable by a SHA where
the set of states is 2S×O . Consequently, this policy is enforceable by some k-BSA if the set S × O is ﬁnite and
k = |S × O|.
5.4. Bounded edit automata
A bounded history, used for the deﬁnition of a bounded edit automaton (BEA), is a concatenation of two
sequences; the ﬁrst is accepted by the automaton, and the second is suppressed in order to reinsert it if a valid
preﬁx is recognized. To deﬁne a BEA, we use the construction technique adopted in [19].
Deﬁnition 5.7 (Bounded edit automaton). A BEA of bound k (k-BEA) is an EA 〈,Q = (k ×k)k , q0, 〉
where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states. Each state is a pair 〈Acc, Sup 〉 such that AccSup ∈
k .
• k deﬁnes the maximum size of a history.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, usually the pair 〈, 〉 which means that no preﬁx was accepted and no sequence
was suppressed.
•  : (Q ×) → (Q ×∞) is the (possibly partial) transition function.
For a state 〈Acc, Sup 〉 and an input action a, the new state 〈′Acc, ′Sup 〉 is deﬁned by (〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) such that
the history ′Acc′Sup is an abstraction of AccSupa. We denote by 	 : k+1 → k the abstraction function used
to deﬁne  such that (〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) = (	(AccSupa)) where the function  : k → (k ×k)k speciﬁes
the accepted sequence and the suppressed one depending on the property being enforced by the BEA. Let EMkEA
denote the set of k-BEA-enforceable properties.
Theorem 5.8. For any two positive integers k and k ′ such that k < k ′, we have EMkEA ⊂ EMk ′EA.
Proof. This theorem can be easily proved by following the same intuition used to prove Theorem 5.2.
First, we prove that any property of EMkEA can be enforced by a k ′-BEA. Second, we prove that there exists
a property in EMk ′EA that cannot be enforced by any k-BEA:
(1) Let P be a property of EMkEA. Then, there exists a k-BEA A enforcing P such that A = 〈,Q = (k ×
k)k , q0, 〉. The k ′-BEA enforcing P is A′ = 〈,Q = (k ′ ×k ′)k ′ , q0, ′〉 where the transition func-
tion ′ : ((k ′ ×k ′)k ′ ×) → (k ′ ×k ′)k ′ is deﬁned such that:
∀q ∈ (k ′ ×k ′)k ′ .∀a ∈ .′(q, a) = (q, a) if  is deﬁned for q and a, otherwise ′(q, a) is not deﬁned.
(2) There exists a property P ∈ EMk ′EA for which, there is no k-BEA enforcing it. This property is deﬁned by
P = {a1 . . . ak ′+1} where the set of input actions is deﬁned by  = {a1, . . . , ak ′+1}. Indeed, to recognize the
sequence a1 . . . ak ′+1 we need to save the history of the last k ′ actions which is not possible by any k-BEA
since k < k ′. 
5.5. Enforcing transaction-based properties using BEA
Transaction-based properties specify that transactions must be atomic. A transaction is atomic if either the
entire transaction is executed or no part of it is executed. To this class of properties belong database transactions
[22] and e-commerce transactions. Transaction properties are usually speciﬁed by T∞ where T ⊆ ∗ is the set
of valid transactions deﬁned over a set of possible actions. A transaction-based property is not enforceable by
security automata since there exists some illegal (bad) executions that can be extended to legal (valid) executions.
An edit automaton can enforce a transaction-based property by suppressing all actions of the execution until
reaching a complete transaction, at thatmoment the automaton insert the suppressed preﬁx. Sincewe are dealing
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Fig. 2. A bounded edit automaton enforcing a transaction-based property.
with bounded history automata, constraints have to be imposed on the size of elements of T . Indeed, if P = T∞
is a transaction-based property then P is k-BEA-enforceable if and only if T ⊆ k+1.
Fig. 2 represents a BEA enforcing the transaction-based property P deﬁned by P = {tp , pt, pt, pt, pt}∞
where t is the action of taking a media resource, p is the action of paying for a media resource, and  is any
action other than taking or paying for a media resource. A transaction is accepted if it is either (1) taking a media
resource and then paying immediately for it or (2) paying for a media resource and making at most three other
actions before actually taking the media resource. The abstraction function 	 and the function  used to deﬁne
the transition function are deﬁned by the following:
	(p) = p 	(p) = p 	(t) = t 	(p) = p
	(p) = p 	(pt) =  	(tp) = 
(p) = 〈, p〉 (p) = 〈, p〉 () = 〈, 〉
(p) = 〈, p〉 (t) = 〈, t〉 (p) = 〈, p〉
5.6. Bounded history-based taxonomy of EM-enforceable policies
Theorems 5.2 and 5.8 together, allow us to identify a new taxonomy of EM-enforceable policies that is based
on memory-limitation constraints. Indeed, if we denote by EMSA the class of properties that are enforceable by
SA, then by Theorem 5.2, we get the following taxonomy: EM 0SA ⊂ EM 1SA ⊂ EM 2SA . . . ⊂ EMSA. The smallest
class of this taxonomy is the class of properties that are enforceable by BSA having no space to save the
execution history and the biggest class is the class of properties that are enforceable by security automata
having no constraint on the space used to save the execution history. Similarly, if we denote by EMEA the
class of properties that are enforceable by EA, then by Theorem 5.8, we get the following taxonomy: EM 0EA ⊂
EM 1EA ⊂ EM 2EA . . . ⊂ EMEA. Note that for any positive integer k , we have EMkSA ⊂ EMkEA.
6. Bounded history automata and local testability
Locally testable (LT) properties [3] are identiﬁed as the class of properties recognizable by inspecting “local”
information. These properties have been well studied in the literature, mainly, from the standpoints of language
and semigroup theories [3,7,23,24,15]. Also, the problem of deciding whether a property is LT has been well
investigated and many algorithms have been proposed [13,14,28]. LT properties have practical importance
since they are characterized by a low memory demand for their veriﬁcation. In this section, we investigate
the connection between LT properties and BHA-enforceable properties. More precisely, we (1) identify the
conditions under which a LT property is BHA-enforceable and (2) show how to use LT properties decision
algorithm to identity BHA-enforceable properties.
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Fig. 3. A scanner.
6.1. Locally testable properties
Locally testable properties are properties recognizable by scanners (Fig. 3); automata equipped with a ﬁnite
memory and a sliding window of a ﬁxed length n [3]. To analyze a sequence, the sliding window is moved from
left to right on the input sequence. During the analysis of an input sequence, the scanner remembers the preﬁxes
or sufﬁxes of length smaller than n and the factors of length n. Depending on the identiﬁed sets of preﬁxes,
sufﬁxes, and factors, the scanner accepts or to rejects the input sequence.
In the sequel, we present the different classes of LT properties that we can found in the literature.4 The
main classes of locally testable properties are strictly locally testable, preﬁx testable, sufﬁx testable, preﬁx–sufﬁx
testable, and strongly locally testable. It is important to note that the deﬁnitions of LT properties over inﬁnite
sequences are presented in such a form that LT properties can easily be viewed as renewal properties (Deﬁnition
4.4). This will facilitate the proofs of theorems identifying BEA-enforceable LT properties (Section 6.3). For
each LT class, we deﬁne the conditions (if any) that a property must satisfy to be preﬁx-closed. This will help to
identify BSA-enforceable LT properties.5
We start by the class of strictly LT properties since the other LT properties classes can be viewed as subclasses
of it.
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Strictly locally testable property).
Let k be a positive integer. A property L of ∞ is strictly k-locally testable (strictly k-LT) if there exist four
sets P , S ⊆ k−1, X ⊆ k−1 and F ⊆ k such that the elements of L are deﬁned by the two following rules:
∀ ∈ ∗. ∈ L ⇔ ( ∈ X) ∨ (([..k − 1] ∈ P) ∧ ([|| − k + 2..] ∈ S) ∧ (Factk () ⊆ F)) (7)
∀ ∈ ω. ∈ L ⇔ ∀′ ∈ Pref ().∃′′ ∈ Pref ().′ ∈ Pref (′′) ∧ ′′ ∈ L (8)
where [|| − k + 2..] is the sufﬁx of  of length k − 1.
A property L of ∞ is strictly locally testable (strictly LT) if it is strictly k-LT for some integer k .
According to this deﬁnition, the set of all sequences of a strictly LT property L is deﬁned by L = ((P∞ ∩
(∗S)∞) \∗F∞) ∪ X where F = k \ F . The set of all ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by L ∩∗ = ((P∗ ∩
∗S) \∗F∗) ∪ X . Similarly, the set of all inﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by the set L ∩ω = (Pω ∩
(∗S)ω) \∗Fω . We suppose that X = { ∈ L : || < k}. Thus, a sequence  ∈ k−1 is a sequence of L if
and only if  ∈ X . The sets P and S deﬁne two sets of factors, Finitial and Fterminal where:
• Finitial =
{ {f ∈ F | Pref (f) ∩ P /= ∅} if P /= ∅
F if P = ∅
• Fterminal =
{ {f ∈ F | Suf (f) ∩ S /= ∅} if S /= ∅
F if S = ∅
The set Finitial represents the set of all factors of length k that can be accepted as preﬁxes of a sequence of L.
Fterminal represents the set of all factors of length k that can be accepted as sufﬁxes of a sequence of L.
4 The deﬁnitions of LT properties provided in this paper cover both ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences. In the literature, LT properties over
ﬁnite sequences and LT properties over inﬁnite sequences are treated separately [7,23].
5 For the sake of paper readability, the proofs related to preﬁx-closed LT properties are presented in Appendix A.
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The property LL = (({ab }∗ ∩∗{ba}) \∗{aaa, abb, bab, bba, bbb}∗) ∪ {aa, bb} is an example of a 3-LT
property where = {a, b, c}, P = {ab }, S = {ba}, X = {aa, bb}, F = {aba, baa, aab}, F = {aaa, abb, bab, bba, bbb},
and Finitial = Fterminal = {aba}. The property LL can also be written as LL = {aba}∗ ∪ {aa, bb}.
Since the deﬁnition of a strictly LT property L makes no constraints on the sets P ,X , S and F , some factors
of F cannot be factors of any sequence of L. This can happen when a factor f is in F while there is no sequence
of L that can have f as a factor. For example, if for the property LL deﬁned above, the set F is deﬁned such that
F = {aba, baa, aab, bbb}, then there is no sequence  of LL counting bbb as a factor.
For some results of this section we need the exact deﬁnition of the factors actually used to construct the
sequences of a strictly LT property. Let L be a strictly k-LT property deﬁned by the sets P , S , F , and X . We
denote by FR, the set of all factors actually used to construct the sequences of L. The set FR is deﬁned by
FR = {f ∈ F |∃ ∈ ∗.(f ∈ L ∨ ∃′ ∈ +.f′ ∈ L).
Proposition 6.2. Let k be any positive integer, and let F ⊆ k , P , S ⊆ k−1, and X ⊆ k−1 be the sets used to
deﬁne a strictly k-LT property L. The property L is preﬁx-closed if and only if: (I) X ∪ Finitial is preﬁx-closed, and
(II) FR ⊆ Fterminal.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
We start by preﬁx-testable properties that are recognizable by inspecting only preﬁxes of limited size.
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Preﬁx-testable property).Let k be a positive integer. A property L of∞ is k-preﬁx-testable (k-PT)
if there exist two sets P ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1 such that the elements of L are deﬁned by the following rule:
∀ ∈ ∞. ∈ L ⇔ ( ∈ X) ∨ ([..k] ∈ P). (9)
A property L of ∞ is preﬁx testable (PT) if it is k-preﬁx testable for some integer k .
According to this deﬁnition, The set of all sequences of a preﬁx testable property L is deﬁned by L = P∞ ∪ X .
The set of all ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by L ∩∗ = P∗ ∪ X . Similarly, the set of all inﬁnite sequences of
L is deﬁned by the set L ∩ω = Pω .
Proposition 6.4. Let k be any positive integer, and let L be a k-preﬁx-testable property deﬁned by the two sets
P ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1. The property L is preﬁx-closed if and only if X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
Respectively, sufﬁx testable properties are recognizable by inspecting only sufﬁxes of limited size.
Deﬁnition 6.5 (Sufﬁx testable property). Let k be a positive integer. A property L of∞ is k-sufﬁx testable (k-ST)
if there exist two sets S ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1 such that the elements of L are deﬁned by the two following rules:
∀ ∈ ∗. ∈ L ⇔ ( ∈ X) ∨ ([|| − k + 1..] ∈ S) (10)
∀ ∈ ω. ∈ L ⇔ ∀′ ∈ Pref (). ∃′′ ∈ Pref (). ′ ∈ Pref (′′) ∧ ′′ ∈ L (11)
where [|| − k + 1..] is the sufﬁx of  of length k .
A property L of ∞ is sufﬁx testable (ST) if it is k-sufﬁx testable for some integer k .
According to this deﬁnition, the set of all sequences of a sufﬁx testable property L is deﬁned by L =
(∗S)∞ ∪ X . The set of all ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by L ∩∗ = ∗S ∪ X . Similarly, the set of all in-
ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by the set L ∩ω = (∗S)ω .
By inspecting both preﬁxes and sufﬁxes of limited size, we have the class of preﬁx–sufﬁx testable properties:
Deﬁnition 6.6 (Preﬁx–sufﬁx testable property). Let k be a positive integer. A property L of ∞ is k-preﬁx–sufﬁx
testable (k-PST) if there exist three sets P , S ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1 such that the elements of L are deﬁned by the
two following rules:
∀ ∈ ∗.  ∈ L ⇔  ∈ X ∨ ([..k] ∈ P ∧ [| − k + 1..] ∈ S) (12)
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∀ ∈ ω.  ∈ L ⇔ ∀′ ∈ Pref (). ∃′′ ∈ Pref ().′ ∈ Pref (′′) ∧ ′′ ∈ L (13)
where [|| − k + 1..] is the sufﬁx of  of length k .
A property L of ∞ is preﬁx–sufﬁx testable (PST) if it is k-preﬁx–sufﬁx testable for some integer k .
According to this deﬁnition, the set of all sequences of a PST property L is deﬁned by L = (P∞ ∩ (∗S)∞) ∪
X . The set of all ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by the set (L ∩∗) = P∗S ∪ X . Similarly, the set of all inﬁnite
sequences of L is deﬁned by the set L ∩ω = Pω ∩ (∗S)ω .
The following proposition states that ST and PST properties are not preﬁx-closed. This result will be used in
6.2 to deduce that these property classes are not BSA-enforceable.
Proposition 6.7. Let k be any positive integer, and let P , S ,X be three sets such that P , S ⊆ k , and X ⊆ k−1. If
L is a k-ST property deﬁned by the two sets S and X or a k-PST property deﬁned by the sets P , S , and X , then L is
not preﬁx-closed.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
The strongly locally testable properties are a variety of LT properties that are recognizable by inspecting only
factors of ﬁxed size.
Deﬁnition 6.8 (Strongly locally testable property). Let k be a positive integer. A property L of ∞ is k-strongly
locally testable (k-SLT) if there exists a set F ⊆ k such that the elements of L are deﬁned by the following rule:
∀ ∈ ∞. ∈ L ⇔ ∀′ ∈ Pref ().Factk(′) ⊆ F (14)
A property L of ∞ is strongly locally testable (SLT) if it is k-strongly locally testable for some integer k .
Let F¯ = k \ F be the complement of F in k . According to Deﬁnition 6.8, the set of all sequences of a SLT
property L is deﬁned by L = ∞ \ (∗F¯ ∞). The set of all ﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by the set (L ∩∗) =
∗ \ (∗F¯ ∗). Similarly, the set of all inﬁnite sequences of L is deﬁned by the set L ∩ω = ω \ (∗F¯ ω).
Proposition 6.9. Let k be any positive integer, and let F ⊆ k . If L is a k-SLT property deﬁned by the set F , then
L is preﬁx-closed.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
6.2. BSA-enforceable locally testable properties
In what follows, we study the problem of deciding whether a LT property is BSA-enforceable. The results of
this section will help to check whether a LT property is enforceable by a memory-constrained CEM when the
CEM is characterized by some k-BSA. SinceBSA is a class of security automata, only preﬁx-closedLTproperties
are BSA-enforceable. Based on this rule, the following theorems identify BSA-enforceable LT properties and
LT properties that are not BSA-enforceable. The proofs6 related to those BSA-enforceable LT properties detail
the construction of a BSA enforcing a given LT property.
Theorem 6.10. Let k be any positive integer. Any preﬁx-closed strictly k-LT testable property L is enforceable by
some k-BSA.
Proof.FromProposition 6.2, L is preﬁx-closed if and only if: (I)X ∪ Finitial is preﬁx-closed, and (II) FR ⊆ Fterminal.
The k-BSA A enforcing L is deﬁned by the 5-tuple 〈,Q = k , k , , 〉 where the transition function  is deﬁned
by:
6 For the sake of paper readability, only the theorem proof related to BSA-enforceable strictly LT properties is detailed in this section.
The other proofs are presented in Appendix A and can be deduced from the proof detailed here.
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∀ ∈ Q.∀a ∈ . (, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a if a ∈ X ∪ Finitial (a)
[2..]a if ( ∈ FR ∧ [2..]a ∈ FR) (b)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (c)
The k-BSA A recognizes all the sequences
of L and only the sequences of L. Let  be any sequence of ∞. We have the two following cases:
(1) Case ||  k, i.e.,  ∈ X ∪ Finitial: SinceX ∪ Finitial is preﬁx-closed and by the deﬁnition ofQ, each sequence
of X ∪ Finitial is represented by a state, rule (a) ensures that each sequence of X ∪ Finitial is recognizable by
A. Indeed, any sequence  of X ∪ Finitial is recognizable by the path:  [1]−→ [1] . . . [m]−→  where || = m.
It is clear that any sequence of k \ (X ∪ Finitial) cannot be recognized by A.
(2) Case  inﬁnite or || > k: Any sequence of L of length greater than k is a sequence that starts by a factor
of Finitial, all its factors are in FR and ends by a factor of Fterminal. By deﬁnition,  starts by a factor of
Finitial. The deﬁnition ofQ and rule (b) ensure that each preﬁx of  with length greater than or equal to k is
recognizable and ends by a factor belonging to FR. By condition (II), any factor of FR is in Fterminal, which
means that all ﬁnite preﬁxes recognized by A are in L since they end by a factor of Fterminal. Indeed any ﬁnite
preﬁx ′′′ of  is recognizable by the path  
′[1]−→ ′[1] . . . ′[k − 1 ] ′[k]−→ ′ ′′[1]−→ f1 
′′[2]−→ f2 . . . fd−1 
′′[d]−→
fd where ′ ∈ Finitial, |′′| = d , f1 = ′[2..]′′[1], ∀ 1 < i  d.fi = fi−1[2..]′′[i], ∀ 1  i  d.fi ∈ FR, and
fd ∈ Fterminal. It is obvious that no sequence outside L can be recognized by A. 
Given a strictly k-LT property L, one can (1) use Proposition 6.2 to verify whether L is preﬁx-closed and if
so, (2) use the automata construction technique detailed in the proof of Theorem 6.10 to construct the k-BSA
enforcing L.
Theorem 6.11. Let k be any positive integer. Any preﬁx-closed k-PT property L is enforceable by some k-BSA.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.10. It is presented in Appendix A. 
Similarly, Given a k-LT property L, one can (1) use Proposition 6.4 to verify whether L is preﬁx-closed and
if so, (2) use the automata construction technique detailed in the proof of Theorem 6.11 to construct the k-BSA
enforcing L.
Theorem 6.12. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-SLT property L is enforceable by some k-BSA.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.10. It is presented in Appendix A. 
Given a k-SLT property L, one can directly use the automata construction technique detailed in the proof of
Theorem 6.12 to construct the k-BSA enforcing L, since L is preﬁx-closed according to Proposition 6.9.
Theorem 6.13. ST properties and PST properties are not BSA-enforceable.
Proof. The proof can be immediately deduced from Proposition 6.7. Indeed, ST properties and PST properties
are not preﬁx-closed and consequently they are not enforceable by security automata. 
Given a ST or a PST property L, one can deduce from Theorem 6.13, that L is not BSA-enforceable and
consequently not enforceable by memory-constrained CEMs.
6.3. BEA-enforceable locally testable properties
In what follows, we study the problem of deciding whether a LT property is BEA-enforceable. Based on the
results of this section, one can check whether a LT property is enforceable by a memory-constrained RWEM
when the RWEM is characterized by some k-BEA. The following theorems deﬁne conditions (if any) under
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which a LT property is BEA-enforceable. For any BEA-enforceable LT property L, the theorem proof7 detail
how to construct a BEA enforcing L.
The following deﬁnition is needed for the ﬁrst theorem.
Deﬁnition 6.14.
Let L be a strictly k-LT property deﬁned using the sets X , P , S and F . Then for any factor f ∈ Finitial, we
deﬁne xf as the longest element of the set X ∩ Pref (f).
Intuitively, Sup(f) represents the longest sequence edited by the edit automaton after reading the
factor f .
Theorem 6.15. Let k be any positive integer. A strictly k-LT property L is enforceable by some k-BEA if and only
if L satisﬁes the followings:
∀fi ∈ Finitial.∀f ∈ F \ Fterminal.Fact(xfif) ⊆ F ⇒ Fact(xfif) ∩ Fterminal /= ∅ (15)
∀ft ∈ Fterminal.∀f ∈ F \ Fterminal.Fact(ftf) ⊆ F ⇒ Fact(ftf) ∩ Fterminal /= ∅ (16)
Proof.Weprove this result by constructing theBEAenforcingL. Let k be anypositive integer and let P , S ⊆ k−1,
X ⊆ k−1 and F ⊆ k be the sets used to deﬁne the strictly k-LT property L over ∞. The BEA enforcing L
is deﬁned by the EA A = 〈,Q = (k ×k)k , 〈, 〉, 〉 of bound k where the partial transition function  is
deﬁned such that ∀〈Acc, Sup 〉 ∈ Q.∀a ∈ .
(a) AccSup ∈ Pref (X ∪ P) ⇒ (〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) =⎧⎨
⎩
(〈Acc, Supa〉, ) if AccSupa ∈ (k−1 \ X) ∪ (Finitial \ Fterminal) (1)
(〈AccSupa, 〉, Supa) if AccSupa ∈ X ∪ (Finitial ∩ Fterminal) (2)
Undeﬁned, otherwise.
(b) AccSup ∈ F ⇒ (〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) =⎧⎨
⎩
(〈Acc[2..]Supa, 〉, ) if Acc[2..]Supa ∈ Fterminal (3)
(〈Acc[2..], Supa〉, Supa) if Acc[2..]Supa ∈ F \ Fterminal (4)
Undeﬁned, otherwise.
(c) Undeﬁned otherwise.
The automaton A recognizes any ﬁnite sequence  of L, we consider the two cases:
• Case ||  k , i.e.,  ∈ X ∪ (Finitial ∩ Fterminal): The deﬁnition of  ensures that any element of the set X ∪
(Finitial ∩ Fterminal) can be recognized by reaching a state 〈, 〉. Rules (1) and (2) ensure that any such state is
reachable by the path 〈, 〉 [1]→[1]〈1Acc, 1Sup 〉
[2]→[2] . . .
[m−1]→[m−1] 〈m−1Acc, m−1Sup 〉
[m]→[m] 〈, 〉where || = m and ∀i. 1 <
i < m.i = (〈i−1Acc, i−1Sup 〉, [i]), and∀i. 1  i < m. iAcciSup = [..i] ∧ ([..i] ∈ X ∪ (Finitial ∩ Fterminal) ⇒
iSup = ).
• Case || > k , i.e.,  = ′′′ where ′ ∈ Finitial and Factk(′′′) ⊆ F and  ends by a factor of Fterminal: Rules (1)
and (2) allow the recognition of the preﬁx ′ by reaching the state 〈′Acc, ′Sup 〉 where ′Sup =  if ′ ∈ Fterminal.
Rules (3) and (4) ensure that any factor of length k of  is an element of F and that the last factor is an element
of Fterminal. Indeed  is recognizable by the path 〈, 〉→′[1][′1] 〈′1Acc, ′1Sup 〉
′[2]→
[′2]
. . .→[m−1][′m−1] 〈′m−1Acc, ′m−1Sup 〉
′[m]→
[′m]
〈′Acc, ′Sup 〉→′′[1][′′1] −→〈f1Acc, f1Sup 〉
′′[2]→
[′′2]
. . .
′′[d−1]→
[′′d−1]
〈fd−1Acc, fd−1Sup 〉 
′′[d]→
[′′d ]
−→〈fd , 〉 where:
- |′| = k and |′′| = d .
7 For the sake of paper readability, only the theorem proof related to BEA-enforceable strictly LT properties is detailed in this section.
The other proofs that can be deduced from that proof are presented in Appendix A.
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- ∀i.1 < i  k.′i = (〈′i−1Acc, ′i−1Sup 〉, ′[i])
- ∀i.1 i  k . (′[..i] ∈ X ∪ (Finitial ∩ Fterminal) ⇒ ′iSup = ) ∧ ′iAcc′iSup = ′[..i]
- f1Accf1Sup = ′[2..]′′[1].
- ∀ 1 i  d.(fiAccfiSup ∈ Fterminal ⇒ (fiAcc ∈ Fterminal ∧ fiSup = ) ∧ fiAccfiSup ∈ F .
By Deﬁnition 6.1, a strictly LT property is a renewal property. Therefore, any valid inﬁnite sequence  of L
is recognizable by the bounded history automaton. Any such valid inﬁnite sequence  is a sequence that starts
by a preﬁx of P and has all its factors of length k in F by alternating between factors of Fterminal and factors of
F \ Fterminal. Any valid preﬁx of  is recognizable following the path construction described above. Any invalid
preﬁx ′ of  can be read by the automaton by outputting the longest valid preﬁx (ending by a factor of Fterminal)
and reaching the state 〈fAcc, fSup 〉 where f ∈ F \ Fterminal is the last factor of ′. By Deﬁnition 6.1, any invalid
preﬁx ′ can be extended to some valid preﬁx ′′ which can be recognized by a ﬁnite path as described above.

Given a strictly k-LT property L, one (1) can check if L satisﬁes conditions (15) and (16) and if so, (2) use
the automata construction technique detailed in the proof of Theorem 6.15 to construct the k-BEA enforcing L.
Theorem 6.15 proves that BEA enforce more strictly LT properties than BSA since it does not require a strictly
LT property to be preﬁx-closed. However BEA cannot enforce any strictly LT property since they cannot
suppress more than k actions without reediting any suppressed action. Therefore there is no k-BEA that can
enforce a strictly k LT property accepting some sequence  for which there exists some subsequence ′ such
that there is no ′ factor ending by a valid sufﬁx.
Theorem 6.16. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-PT property is enforceable by some k-BEA.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A. The construction of the k-BEA enforcing some k-PT property can
be deduced from the proof of Theorem 6.15. 
Given a k-PT property L, one can use the automata construction technique detailed in the proof of Theorem
6.16 to construct the k-BEA enforcing L.
Theorem 6.17. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-SLT property is enforceable by some k-BEA.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix A. As for the previous theorem proof, the construction of the k-BEA
enforcing some k-SLT property can be deduced from the proof of Theorem 6.15. 
Similarly, given a k-SLT property L, one can use the automata construction technique detailed in the proof
of Theorem 6.17 to construct the k-BEA enforcing L.
Theorem 6.18. If || > 1 then any ST property is not BEA-enforceable.
Proof. We have to prove that if || > 1 then for any ST property, there is no BEA enforcing it. We proceed
by contradiction. For some positive integer k , let P be any k-ST property deﬁned by the two sets S ⊆ k and
X ⊆ k−1. Let us suppose that there exists a BEA A = 〈,Q ⊆ (k ′ ×k ′)k ′ , q0, 〉 of bound k ′ enforcing
P . However, we can ﬁnd a sequence  ∈ P that is not recognizable by A. Such sequence can be any sequence
 = ′′′swhere (1) s is any sufﬁx from S , (2) ′ ∈ P , (3) Factk(′′) ∩ S = ∅, and (4) |′′|> k ′. Intuitively, in order
to recognize , we need to suppress the entire subsequence ′′ and save it in the bounded history in order to
reinsert it after identifying the sufﬁx s. This is not possible since the size of ′′ is greater than the size of the
bounded history that the automaton can track. Therefore, we have proved that there is no BEA enforcing P .
The existence of the sequence ′′ is guaranteed by the fact that (a) || > 1 and (b) P is really specifying a sufﬁx
testable property. Indeed, if¬(|| > 1), i.e., || = 1, e.g., = {a} then P = ({a}∗ak)∞ ∪ X = aka∞ ∪ X which is a
preﬁx-testable property! In this case, thepropertyP is studiedas sufﬁx testablewhile, in reality, it speciﬁes apreﬁx-
testable property. For the case || > 1 and P is really specifying a sufﬁx testable property, the existence of ′′ is
ensured. Indeed, if there is no sequence′′ satisfying (3) and (4) then there exists some integer k ′′  k ′ and some set
R ⊆ k ′′ such that P = (RS)∞ ∪ X . Let Pr and F be two sets deﬁned such that Pr = Pref k−1({s| ∈ R ∧ s ∈ S})
and F = Factk({s| ∈ R ∧ s ∈ S}) ∪ Factk({s| ∈ R ∧ s ∈ S}). Then, the property P can be viewed as a strictly
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k-locally testable property deﬁned by the sets Pr, S , X , and F . Indeed P = ((Pr∞ ∩ (∗S)∞) \∗F∞) ∪ X
where F = k \ F . Thus the property P is studied as sufﬁx testable property while in reality, it is specifying a
strictly locally testable property which is in contradiction with (b). 
According to Theorem 6.18, BEA cannot enforce ST properties since they cannot suppress more than k
actions without reediting any suppressed action. Indeed, in the general case (|| > 1), for any positive k value,
one can ﬁnd some sequence ′′′s where s is a valid sufﬁx and |′′| > k such that there is no preﬁx ending by a
valid sufﬁx, i.e., a sufﬁx satisfying the ST property to enforce. For such a sequence ′′, the k-BEA suppresses the
ﬁrst k actions before halting the execution since it cannot continue accepting input actions without reediting any
suppressed action. However, halting the execution will prevent the valid sequence ′′′s from being executed. If
we cannot ﬁnd the sequence ′′, then according to the proof of Theorem 6.18, the property is not really k-sufﬁx
testable since it can be viewed as strictly k-locally testable. In this case, studying its BEA-enforceability as strictly
LT property using Theorem 6.15 is more interesting than studying its BEA-enforceability as ST property using
Theorem 6.18.
If || = 1, e.g.,  = {a}, then for any k-ST property L, we can construct a k-BEA enforcing it. The k-BEA
suppresses the ﬁrst k actions of the execution and reedit the suppressed subsection each time it identiﬁes an
element of X . After reading the ﬁrst k actions, the k-BEA simply accepts any input action because at any time
the sequence length is greater than k and we have a sufﬁx of k actions which satisﬁes the property.8 As one can
see, such properties are not interesting since they can be viewed as preﬁx-testable properties, by taking the same
set X and the set S as a set of preﬁxes.
Theorem 6.19. If || > 1 then any PST property is not BEA-enforceable.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 6.18. It is presented in Appendix A. 
Similarly, in the general case of k > 1 and according to Theorem 6.19, BEA cannot enforce PST properties
since they cannot suppress more than k actions without reediting any suppressed action.
The following two propositions show that ST properties and PST properties can be enforced by unbounded
edit automata.
Theorem 6.20. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-ST property L is enforceable by some edit automaton.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
Theorem 6.21. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-PST property L is enforceable by some edit automaton.
Proof. Please see Appendix A for the proof. 
Although ST and PST properties are not BEA-enforceable, Theorem 6.21 proves that these twoLT properties
classes can be enforced by unbounded EA. In fact, all LT properties classes presented in this paper are EA-
enforceable since they are deﬁned as renewal properties.
6.4. Locally testable EM-enforceable properties
In 6.2 and 6.3, we investigated BHA-enforceable local properties. According to the provided results, one can
check whether a local property is BHA-enforceable. For any BHA-enforceable local property, we showed how
to construct the BHA enforcing it.
However, in practice, security policies are rarely speciﬁed as local properties. Indeed, security policies are
usually speciﬁed in formalisms easily translatable to ﬁnite automata. Fortunately, deciding whether a property
is local has been well investigated and many deciding algorithms have been proposed [28,14,13,21]. Since the
majority of existing algorithms take as input properties speciﬁed by deterministic ﬁnite automata, we investigate
in the sequel the translation of SA and EA into deterministic ﬁnite automata.
8 In this special case, the set S used to deﬁne any k-ST property consists of only one k-length sequence  where each  action is equal to a.
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Because we are dealing with both ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences, Büchi automata seem to be the most suitable
automata model for specifying EM-enforceable security policies.9 First we recall the formal deﬁnition of Büchi
automata and explain their property recognition mode.10
Deﬁnition 6.22 (Büchi automata [24]). A Büchi automaton B is a 5-tuple 〈,Q, I , F , 〉 where:
•  is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite input actions.
• Q is the set of ﬁnite or countably inﬁnite automaton states.
• q0 is the initial state.
• F ⊆ Q is the set of ﬁnal states.
•  : (Q ×) → Q is the (possibly partial) transition function.
Recognizing paths of ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences is presented in the following:
(1) Aﬁnite sequence  such that || = n is recognizable byBüchi automatonB, if there exists a ﬁnite path of the
form q0
[1]−→ q1 . . . qn−1 [n]−→ qn where ∀ 0  i  n. qi ∈ Q. ∀ 0  i < n. (qi , [i + 1]) = qi+1 and qn ∈ F .
Therefore,  is recognizable by a ﬁnite path starting from the initial state q0 and ending in a ﬁnal state.
(2) An inﬁnite sequence  is recognizable by Büchi automaton B, if there exists an inﬁnite path p of the form
q0
[1]−→ q1 . . . qn−1 [n]−→ qn [n+1]−→ . . . such that some ﬁnal state f occurs inﬁnitely often in p .
Proposition 6.23. For any security automaton A = 〈,Q, q0, 〉 there exists a Büchi automaton recognizing the
property AP enforced by A.
Proof. The Büchi automaton recognizing the property AP enforced by A is the automaton A′ = 〈,Q, q0,Q, 〉.
This means that a security automaton is simply a Büchi automaton for which all states are ﬁnal states. 
Deﬁnition 4.2 allows us to view EA characterizing effective=-enforcers as sequence recognizers rather than
sequence transformers. AlthoughEAwere introduced as sequence transformers, themain relevant contributions
targeting EA-enforcement were demonstrated using EA acting as effective=-enforcers. Indeed, in [19,18,1], an
effective=-enforcer is characterized by an EA that suppresses a sequence of potentially dangerous actions until
it can conﬁrm that the sequence is legal, at which point it inserts all the suppressed actions. This is exactly the
same principle used by automata-based compilers. Following this intuition, we can easily construct a Büchi
automaton specifying the property being enforced by an EA acting as effective=-enforcer.
Proposition 6.24. For any edit automaton A = 〈,∗ ×∗, 〈, 〉, 〉 effectively=-enforcing a property P , there
exists a Büchi automaton specifying P .
Proof. The Büchi automaton specifying the property P is A′ such that A′ = 〈,∗ ×∗, 〈, 〉, F , ′〉 where:
• F = {〈, 〉| ∈ P ∩∗} is the set of ﬁnite states.
• ′ : (Q ×) → Q is the transition function. For a state q = 〈Acc, Sup 〉 and
an input action a: ′(q, a) =
{
q′ if (q, a) = (q′, ).
Undeﬁned, if  is not deﬁned for the pair (q, a).

Fig. 4 shows an edit automaton enforcing the property P = {a, abc, acb} and the corresponding Büchi
automaton.
6.4.1. Local testability decision algorithms
Many algorithms have been proposed to decide whether a given property is LT or not. If the property is LT,
then these algorithms can estimate the optimal locality order of the property, i.e., the smallest k for which the
9 If EM-enforceable security policies are deﬁned only over ﬁnite sequences then ﬁnite automata can be used instead of Büchi automata.
10 We use the deﬁnition of a Büchi automaton provided in [24] since it allows recognizing ﬁnite and inﬁnite sequences.
178 C. Talhi et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 158–184
Fig. 4. An edit automaton and the corresponding Büchi automaton.
property can be speciﬁed as LT. The algorithms deciding whether a property is LT or not, have a polynomial-
time complexity. However, ﬁnding the precise order of local testability is proved to be NP-hard. Fortunately,
many algorithms have been proposed to provide a locality order estimation for a given LT property. These
algorithms are usually, polynomial-time hard.
The implementations of many LT decision algorithms can be found in the TESTApackage [32], implemented
using C/C++. The existing algorithms can be classiﬁed into two main categories, depending on the model used
to specify the analyzed property. The ﬁrst class is based on analyzing properties speciﬁed by deterministic ﬁnite
automata while the second class is based on analyzing properties speciﬁed by syntactic semigroups:
(1) The algorithms analyzing properties speciﬁed by deterministic ﬁnite automata start by reducing the ana-
lyzed automata. Reducing an automaton consists in modifying it in such a way that each path not used to
recognize the property sequences is suppressed from the automaton transition graph. As examples of the
algorithms belonging to this category, we can cite:
• The algorithm provided in [13] to decide whether a given property is LT or not. The time-complexity of
this algorithm is o(||n2|)where is the automaton alphabet and n is the cardinality of the automaton
state set.
• The two algorithms provided in [21]. The ﬁrst algorithm decides whether a given property is strictly
LT or not. The time-complexity of this algorithm is o(||2mn|) where , m, and n are, respectively, the
alphabet, the number of edges and the number of states of the ﬁnite automaton specifying the property.
The second algorithm estimates the locality-order of a given LT property. This algorithm has the same
time-complexity as the ﬁrst algorithm.
(2) The algorithms analyzing properties speciﬁed by syntactic semigroups are deﬁned on the basis of semi-
groups theory. A syntactic semigroup is a semigroup associated with some automaton where the structure
of the syntactic semigroup is derived from the transition graph structure of the automaton. Associating
a semigroup to some automaton allows verifying some property on the syntactic semigroup instead of
verifying it on the original automaton. This approach is motivated by the fact that many results can be
veriﬁedmore easily using semigroups theory than by using automata theory.As examples of the algorithms
belonging to this category, we can cite [29] and [27].
6.5. Local testability-based approach for memory-constrained enforcement
The results provided in this Sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 allow us to deﬁne a general approach for identifying
security policies enforceable by memory-constrained EM (Fig. 5). The main procedures used in this approach
are the following:
A If the security policy is known to be LT, then by Theorems 6.11, 6.12, and 6.10, we can check if the property
is enforceable by memory-constrained CEM (BSA-enforceable), and by Theorems 6.16, 6.17, and 6.15 we
can check if the property is enforceable by memory-constrained RWEM (BEA-enforceable).
B If the property is speciﬁed by a Büchi automaton, then we ﬁrst reduce the automaton. After, we call the
decision algorithm, if it is based on deterministic automata. Otherwise, we produce the syntactic semigroup
and then call the decision algorithm. If the algorithm reveals that the property is LT then procedure A is
C. Talhi et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 158–184 179
BSA/BEA
enforceable?
Yes
No
LT
Property
SA/EA Specified
Security Property
Buchi Automaton
Reduced Buchi
Automaton
We cannot decide
whether the property
is BSA/BEA
enforceable or not!
LT
Decision Algorithm
LT
Property
Not LT
Property
BSA/BEA
Enforceable
Security Property
Not BSA/BEA
Enforceable
Security Property
Syntactic
Semigroup
Fig. 5. Identifying BHA-enforceable locally testable properties.
used to check if the property is BSA/BEA-enforceable. Otherwise, the algorithm cannot decide whether
the property is BSA/BEA-enforceable or not.
C If the property is speciﬁed by a SA or an EA, then we can construct the corresponding Büchi automaton
by using one of the construction techniques presented in the proofs of Propositions 6.23 or 6.24. Once
constructed, the result automaton is minimized and sent to procedure B.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we propose a characterization of the security policies that are enforceable by executionmonitors
constrained by memory limitations. The work presented here, is in the same line as the research work advanced
by Schneider [25], Ligatti et al. [1, 18] and Fong [9] which addresses security policy enforcement. Our approach
gives rise to a realistic evaluation of the enforcement power of execution monitoring. This evaluation is based
on bounding the memory size used by the monitor to save execution history, and identifying the security policies
enforceable under such constraint.
Our contribution in characterizing memory-constrained EM is mainly threefold. First, we instantiated and
extended an abstraction based on memory limitation to security automata [25] as well as to edit automata
[1], the two main automata models characterizing EM-enforceable security policies. The result is a new class
of automata that we call bounded history automata including two subclasses, bounded security automata and
bounded edit automata. Second, we identiﬁed a new taxonomy of EM-enforceable properties that is directed
by the size of the space used by execution monitors to save execution history. Third, we reasoned about the
memory-constrained enforcement power by investigating the enforcement of locally testable properties [3], a
well studied class of languages recognizable by investigating local information. Among the existing locally
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testable properties classes, we identiﬁed (1) those classes that can be enforced by BHA, (2) those that are not
BHA-enforceable at all, and (3) those that can be BHA-enforceable under some conditions and we precisely
identiﬁed such conditions. These results were reinforced by pointing out algorithms that can decide whether a
security policy is locally testable or not. This allowed us to deﬁne a general approach for deciding whether a
given security policy is enforceable by memory-constrained EM. This approach is based on existing algorithms
which decide locally testable properties.
As future work, we plan to:
• Design and implement tools for specifying security policies enforceable by memory-constrained EM. These
tools will be based on selecting the best algorithms identifying locally testable properties and adapting them
to EM-enforceable properties. This will improve our BHA-enforceable security policies classiﬁcation by
identifying new classes of practical EM-enforceable policies.
• Deﬁne new characterizations of constrained-EM based on language theory results. These characterizations
will cover different kinds of constraints and, hence, different kinds of execution abstractions. In additions,
these characterizations should associate EM-enforceable policy classes to language theory classes.
• Generalize our investigation to other classes of security enforcement mechanisms, namely, static analysis and
program rewriting.
Appendex A. Proofs of Theorems
Proposition 6.2. Let k be any positive integer, and let F ⊆ k , P , S ⊆ k−1, and X ⊆ k−1 be the sets used to
deﬁne a strictly k-LT property L. The property L is preﬁx-closed if and only if: (I) X ∪ Finitial is preﬁx-closed, and
(II) FR ⊆ Fterminal.
Proof. Since we have an equivalence statement, we have to prove the two following implication directions:
• If direction: We prove that if (I) and (II) are satisﬁed, then L is preﬁx-closed. The property L can be written as
L = L′ ∪ L′′ where L′ = X ∪ (Finitial ∩ Fterminal) = L ∩k and L′′ = { ∈ L : isinﬁniteor || > k} and L′ ∩
L′′ = ∅.
If (I) is satisﬁed, i.e., if X ∪ Finitial is preﬁx-closed, then L′ is preﬁx-closed. If (II) is satisﬁed, i.e., FR ⊆ Fterminal,
then for any sequence  of L′′, any preﬁx ′ of  such that |′| > k is a sequence of L because ′ is of the form
′′f where ′′ ∈ + and f ∈ Fterminal. In addition, the set of all preﬁxes of  of length less than or equal to k
is a subset of L because this set is equal to Pref (f ′) where f ′ ∈ Finitial and by (I) this set is preﬁx-closed. We
conclude that if (I) and (II) are satisﬁed then L is preﬁx-closed.
• Only-If direction: We prove that if L is preﬁx-closed then conditions (I) and (II) are satisﬁed. We proceed by
contradiction:
(1) Let us suppose that (I) is not satisﬁed, i.e., X ∪ Finitial is not preﬁx-closed. Then we can ﬁnd a sequence
f ∈ L such that ∃′ ∈ ∗.′ ∈ Pref (f)∧ ′ /∈ L where  ∈ ∗ and f ∈ Finitial. Consequently L is not
preﬁx-closed (Contradiction).
(2) Let us assume that (II) is not satisﬁed, i.e., ¬(FR ⊆ Fterminal). Then we can ﬁnd some factor f such that
f ∈ FR and f /∈ Fterminal. According to the deﬁnition of FR, we have either (a) ∃ ∈ ∗.f ∈ L or (b)
∃ ∈ ∗. ∃′ ∈ +.f′ ∈ L. If (a) is true then f must be in Fterminal because the sequences of L cannot
end with a factor not in Fterminal. If (b) is true then the sequence f′ is in L while its preﬁx f is not in
L. Consequently L is not preﬁx-closed (Contradiction). 
Proposition 6.4. Let k be any positive integer, and let L be a k-preﬁx-testable property deﬁned by the two sets
P ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1. The property L is preﬁx-closed if and only if X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed.
Proof. Since we have an equivalence statement, we have to prove the two implication directions:
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• If direction: We suppose that X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed and we prove that any sequence of L has all its preﬁxes
in L. The property L can be written as L = X ∪ P∞. For any  ∈ L we have two cases:
(1) ||  k . Obviously,  ∈ X ∪ P . Since X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed then we have Pref () ⊆ (X ∪ P) ⊂ L.
(2) The sequence  is inﬁnite or || > k . The sequence  is of the form p′ where p ∈ P and ′ ∈ ∞. Any
preﬁx of  of length greater than k is in L because it is of the form p′′ where ′′ ∈ +. Any preﬁx of 
of length less than or equal to k is in L because it is an element of Pref (P).
• Only-If direction: We prove that if L is preﬁx-closed then X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed. We proceed by contradiction.
Let suppose that X ∪ P is not preﬁx-closed. Then ∃ ∈ X ∪ P.∃′ ∈ Pref ().′ /∈ X ∪ P . We have  ∈ L and
′ /∈ L because ′ /∈ X and ′ /∈ P∞. Consequently L is not preﬁx-closed (Contradiction). 
Proposition 6.7. Let k be any positive integer, and let P , S ,X be three sets such that P , S ⊆ k , and X ⊆ k−1.
If L is a k-ST property deﬁned by the two sets S and X or a k-PST property deﬁned by the sets P , S , and X , then
L is not preﬁx-closed.
Proof. Since we can extend any sequence  /∈ L to a sequence ′ ∈ L, the property L is not preﬁx-closed. Indeed,
such sequence  can be extended to the sequence s where s is any element of S . Similarly, for any element p of
P and any sequence  such that p /∈ L′, p can be extended to the sequence ps ∈ L′ where s is any element of
S . Therefore, L′ is not preﬁx-closed. 
Proposition 6.9. Let k be any positive integer, and let F ⊆ k . If L is a k-SLT property deﬁned by the set F , then
L is preﬁx-closed.
Proof. The deﬁnition of a k-SLT property L makes no constraints on the sequences of k−1. Therefore the
preﬁx-closed set k−1 is a subset of L. In addition, any sequence  of L such that ||  k has all its factors in
F . Indeed, any preﬁx ′ of  such |′|  k has all its factors in F and consequently ′ ∈ L. Any preﬁx ′ of 
such that |′| < k is an element of k−1 and consequently ′ ∈ L. We conclude that L is preﬁx-closed. 
Theorem6.11.Let k be any positive integer.Any preﬁx-closed k-PTpropertyL that is deﬁned according toDeﬁnition
6.3 is enforceable by some k-BSA.
Proof. From Proposition 6.4, L is preﬁx-closed if and only if X ∪ P is preﬁx-closed. The k-BSA enforcing L is
deﬁned by A = 〈,Q = k , , 〉 where the transition function  is deﬁned by the following:
∀ ∈ Q.∀a ∈ . (, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a if a ∈ P ∪ X (1)
 if  ∈ P (2)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (3)
The k-BSA A recognizes all the sequences  of L and only the sequences of L. We consider the two cases:
(1) Case ||  k , i.e.,  ∈ P ∪ X : Since P ∪ X is preﬁx-closed and each sequence of P ∪ X is represented by a
state, rule (1) ensures that each sequence of P ∪ X is recognizable by A. Indeed, any sequence  of P ∪ X
is recognizable by the path: 
[1]−→ [1] . . . [m− 1] [m]−→  where || = m. It is easy to see that no sequence
of k \ (X ∪ P) can be recognized by A.
(2) Case || > k: Rules (1) and (2) ensure that  is recognizable by A. Indeed any ﬁnite preﬁx ′′′ of  where
′ ∈ P and ′′ ∈ ∞ is recognizable by the path  ′[1]−→ ′[1] . . . ′[m − 1 ] ′[m]−→ ′ ′′[1]−→ ′ . . . ′ ′′[d]−→ ′
where |′| = m and |′′| = d . By ensuring that any sequence starts by a preﬁx of P , no sequence that is not
in L can be recognized by A. 
Theorem 6.12. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-SLT property L that is deﬁned according to Deﬁnition 6.8 is
enforceable by some k-BSA.
Proof. The BSA enforcing L is deﬁned by A = 〈,Q = k , , 〉 where the transition function  is deﬁned by:
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∀ ∈ Q.∀a ∈ . (, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
a if a ∈ k−1 ∨ a ∈ F (1)
[2..]a if  ∈ F ∧ [2..]a ∈ F (2)
Undeﬁned, otherwise. (3)
The transition function  allow the automaton to recognize any sequence of length less than k and any
sequence of length greater than or equal to k that have all its factors in F . Let  be any sequence of ∞. We
have the two following cases:
(1) Case || < k: Since, the property L makes no constraint on sequences of length less than k , then any
sequence  of k−1 is recognizable by the path 
[1]−→ [1] . . . [m − 1 ] [m]−→  where || = m.
(2) Case  inﬁnite or ||  k: Since L accepts only the sequences of length greater than or equal to k that have
all their factors of length k in F , rules (1) and (2) ensure that any ﬁnite preﬁx ′′′ of  where |′| = k − 1, is
recognizable by A by the path 
′[1]−→ ′[1] . . . ′[k−1]−→ ′ ′′[1]−→ f1 
′′[2]−→ f2 . . . fd−1 
′′[d]−→ fd where |′′| = d and
f1 = ′[2..]′′[1] and ∀ 1 < i  d. fi = fi−1[2..]′′[i] and ∀ 1  i  d.fi ∈ F . Thus all the factors of length
k of  are in F . 
Theorem 6.16. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-PT property is enforceable by some k-BEA.
Proof. Let k be any positive integer and let P ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1 be the sets used to deﬁne the k-PT property
L over ∞. The k-BEA enforcing L is the EA 〈,Q = (k ×k)k , 〈, 〉, 〉 where the transition function 
is deﬁned by the following:
∀〈Acc, Sup 〉 ∈ Q.∀a ∈ .
(〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
(〈AccSupa, 〉, Supa) if AccSupa ∈ P ∪ X (1)
(〈Acc, Supa〉, ) if AccSupa ∈ k \ (P ∪ X) (2)
(〈Acc, 〉, a) if (Acc ∈ P ∧ Sup = ) (3)
Undeﬁned, otherwise.
The deﬁnition of A ensures that any sequence of L is recognizable by A and that no sequence that is not in L
can be recognized by A. For any sequence  of ∞, we have the two following cases:
(1) Case ||  k , i.e.,  ∈ P ∪ X : The deﬁnition of  ensures that any sequence  ∈ P ∪ X can be recog-
nized by reaching a state 〈, 〉. Rules (1) and (2) ensure that any such state is reachable by the path
〈, 〉 [1]→[1]〈1Acc, 1Sup 〉
[2]→[2] . . .
[m−1]→[m−1] 〈m−1Acc, m−1Sup 〉
[m]→[m] 〈, 〉 where:|| = m and ∀i.1 < i < m.i = (〈i−1Acc, i−1Sup 〉, [i]), and ∀i.1  i < m, the state 〈iAcc, iSup 〉 satisﬁes:
(a) iAcciSup = [..i] ∧ ([..i] ∈ P ∪ X ⇒ iSup = ),
(b) (〈i+1Acc, i+1Sup 〉, i+1) = (〈iAcc, iSup 〉, [i]).
(c) (〈1Acc, 1Sup 〉, 1) = (〈, 〉, [1]).
Rule (1) ensures that the entire read sequence is edited when it is in X ∪ P . When the read sequence is in
Pref (X ∪ P) but not in X ∪ P , rule (1) ensures that the longest valid preﬁx is edited and rule (2) ensures
that the remaining sufﬁx is suppressed. When reaching a valid sequence, the longest suppressed sufﬁx is
edited by rule (1) generating a valid sequence.
(2) Case || > k , i.e.,  = ′′′ where ′ ∈ P and ′′ ∈ ∞: Rules (1) and (2) allow the recognition of the preﬁx
′ by reaching the state 〈′, 〉, and rule (3) allows reading the actions of ′′ by looping in the state 〈′, 〉. If
′′ ∈ ∗, then is recognizable by the path 〈, 〉 ′[1]→[1] . . .→
′[m]
[m] 〈′, 〉
′′[1]→
[′′[1]]
〈′, 〉 . . . 〈′, 〉 ′′[d]→
[′′[d]]
〈′, 〉where
|′| = m, |′′| = d , and the path recognizing the preﬁx ′ is presented in the previous case. If ′′ ∈ ω, then
after editing ′, the path recognizing  loops inﬁnitely while reading and editing the elements of ′′.
Intuitively, the elements of P ∪ X are recognizable by reading the preﬁxes of P ∪ X and editing only those
that are elements of P ∪ X . After reaching a valid preﬁx ′ ∈ P , the automaton can recognize any extension
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 = ′′′ of ′ by looping in the state 〈′, 〉 while reading and editing the sequence  without suppressing any
action of ′′. It is obvious that any sequence that is not in L cannot be recognized by the automaton A. 
Theorem 6.17. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-SLT property is enforceable by some k-BEA.
Proof. Let k be any positive integer and let F ⊆ k be the set used to deﬁne the k-SLT property L over
∞. The k-BEA enforcing L is deﬁned by A = 〈,Q = (k ×k)k , 〈, 〉, 〉 where the transition function
 : {〈, 〉| ∈ k} × → {〈, 〉| ∈ k} ×∗ is deﬁned by the following:
∀〈, 〉 ∈ Q.∀a ∈ . (〈, 〉, a) =
⎧⎨
⎩
(〈a, 〉, a) if a ∈ k−1 ∪ F (1)
(〈[2..]a, 〉, a) if , [2..]a ∈ F (2)
Undefined , otherwise.
This BEA recognizes any sequence  of L. We have two cases:
(1) Case || < k: The deﬁnition of  ensures that any sequence  of length less than k can be recognized by
reaching the state 〈, 〉 after editing the whole sequence . If || = m, then rule (1) ensures that any such
state is reachable by the path 〈, 〉 [1]→[[1]]〈[..1], 〉
[2]→[[2]] . . .
[m−1]→[[m−1]]〈[..m− 1], 〉
[m]→[[m]]〈, 〉.
(2) Case ||  k: By rule (1) and rule (2), any sequence having all its factors of length k in F is recogniz-
able. By Deﬁnition 6.8,  is in the property L if and only if all preﬁxes of  are in L. Any preﬁx of  of
length less than k is recognizable by a path as explained in case 1. Any preﬁx of length greater than or
equal to k is of the form ′ = f′′ where f ∈ F and ′′ ∈ ∗. The preﬁx ′ is recognizable by the path:
〈, 〉 f [1]→[f [1]]〈f [..1], 〉
f [2]→[f [2]] . . .
f [k−1]→[f [k−1]]〈f [..k − 1], 〉
f [k]→[f [k]]〈f , 〉
′′[1]→
[′′[1]]
〈f1, 〉 
′′[2]→
[′′[2]]
. . .
′′[m−1]→
[′′[m−1]]
〈fm−1, 〉 
′′[m]→
[′′[m]]
〈fm, 〉
where for all integer i such that 1  i  m. fi ∈ F ∧ fi ∈ Suf(f′′[..i]).
From what follows, it is obvious that any sequence that is not in L cannot be recognized by A. 
Theorem 6.19. If || > 1 then any PST property deﬁned over ∞ is not BEA-enforceable.
Proof. We have to prove that if || > 1 then for any PST property, there is no BEA enforcing it. We proceed
by contradiction. For some positive integer k , let L be any k-PST property deﬁned by the three sets P ⊆ k ,
S ⊆ k and X ⊆ k−1. Let us suppose that there exists a BEA A = 〈,Q ⊆ (k ′ ×k ′)k ′ , q0, 〉 of bound
k ′ enforcing L. However, we can ﬁnd a sequence  ∈ L that is not recognizable by A. Such sequence can be any
sequence  = ′′′swhere (1) s is any sufﬁx from S , (2) ′ ∈ L, (3) Factk(′′) ∩ S = ∅, and (4) |′′| > k ′. Intuitively,
in order to recognize , we need to suppress the entire subsequence ′′ and save it in the bounded history in order
to reinsert it after identifying the sufﬁx s. This is not possible since the size of ′′ is greater than the size of the
bounded history that the automaton can track. Therefore, we have proved that there is no BEA enforcing L. The
existence of the sequence ′′ is guaranteed by the fact that (a) || > 1 and (b) L is really specifying a PSTproperty.
Indeed, if ¬(|| > 1), i.e., || = 1, e.g.,  = {a} then P = ak{a}∞ ∩ ({a}∗ak)∞ ∪ X = aka∞ ∪ X which is a preﬁx
testable property! In this case, the property L is studied as PST while, in reality, it speciﬁes a preﬁx-testable
property. For the case || > 1 and L is really specifying a PST property, the existence of ′′ is ensured. Indeed, if
there is no sequence ′′ satisfying (3) and (4) then there exists some integer k ′′  k ′ and some set R ⊆ k ′′ such
that L = (RS)∞ ∪ X . Let F be the set deﬁned by Factk({s|  ∈ R ∧ s ∈ S}) ∪ Factk({s| ∈ R ∧ s ∈ S}). Then,
the property L can be viewed as a strictly k-locally testable property deﬁned by the sets P , S , X , and F . Indeed
L = ((P∞ ∩ (∗S)∞) \∗F∞) ∪ X where F = k \ F . Thus the property L is studied as PST property while
in reality, it is specifying a strictly locally testable property which is in contradiction with (b). 
Theorem 6.20. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-ST property L is enforceable by some edit automaton.
Proof. We prove this result by constructing the edit automaton enforcing L. The EA enforcing L is deﬁned by
〈,∗ ×∗, 〈, 〉, 〉 where the transition function  is deﬁned by the following:
∀〈Acc, Sup 〉 ∈ ∗ ×∗.∀a ∈ .(〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) ={
(〈Acc, Supa〉, ) if AccSupa /∈ X ∧ Suf (AccSupa) ∩ S = ∅ (1)
(〈AccSupa, 〉, Supa) if AccSupa ∈ X ∨ Suf (AccSupa) ∩ S /= ∅ (2) 
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Theorem 6.21. Let k be any positive integer. Any k-PST property L is enforceable by some edit automaton.
Proof. We prove this result by constructing the edit automaton enforcing L. The EA enforcing L is deﬁned by
〈,∗ ×∗, 〈, 〉, 〉 where the transition function  is deﬁned by the following:
∀〈Acc, Sup 〉 ∈ ∗ ×∗.∀a ∈ .
(〈Acc, Sup 〉, a) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(〈Acc, Supa〉, ) if AccSupa /∈ X∧
(Pref (AccSupa) ∩ P = ∅ ∨ Suf (AccSupa) ∩ S = ∅) (1)
(〈AccSupa, 〉, Supa) if AccSupa ∈ X∨
(Pref (AccSupa) ∩ P /= ∅ ∧ Suf (AccSupa) ∩ S /= ∅) (2)

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